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Abstract
A simple model of indirect taxation, evasion, and enforcement is
presented in which some surprising results emerge. Because of a
'market-thinning' effect of high prices, high taxes lead to multiple
equilibria (low-price black markets and high-price legal markets),
and black-market comparative statics tend to give the 'wrong' sign.
Further, the incentive compatibility constraint for tax compliance
is shown to confer a kind of concavity on enforcement costs. As
a result, enforcement costs may be minimized by tax rates that vary
dramatically between sectors. This consideration is dominant for
relatively ineffective tax administrations, so for them the optimal
tax system follows a 'cash cow' pattern, with one sector bearing all
of the tax; but for relatively effective administrations, the optimum
follows a slightly modified Ramsey rule. This bifurcation of the
parameter space provides one approach to a positive theory of tax
systems.
1. Introduction.
In a black market a good is traded illegally by way of evasion of a tax or regulation.
Where indirect taxes are potentially evadable, the pattern and prevalence of black markets is
likely to be much affected by the pattern of tax rates; thus, potentially, the overall pattern of
optimal taxes might be very much affected by consideration of the enforcement problem. This
paper proposes a simple model for studying this problem.
This question is of some practical importance in most tax jurisdictions, since indirect taxes
have an almost ubiquitous presence. For example, interjurisdictional differences in excise rates
on cigarettes have led to a long history of smuggling between U.S. states1 and from the U.S. into
Canada2. In addition, rising Canadian reliance on a federal sales tax (the GST) has led to new
forms of evasion in that country. For example, the existence of a black market for kielbasa in
Montreal, circulating in evasion of the GST, has recently been documented {Montreal Gazette,
December 23, 1995, p.Al).
However, it is likely to be much more of an issue in the public finance of medium and
low-income economies, since poorer countries lack the means for effective direct taxation3, and
'One study estimated that in 1975 16 U.S. states lost 8% or more of their cigarette tax
revenue through smuggling, and 8 states had 100 million or more packs smuggled into them.
Simon and White (1982, pp. 34, 36).
2See, for example, Chicago Tribune, February 23, 1994, p. 5, and Christian Science Monitor,
February 7, 1994, p.2.
3See Tanzi (1987), and Due (1988, ch.2) for documentation of the much greater reliance of
poorer economies on indirect taxes. As of 1985, countries with per capita GNP below $351
relied on indirect taxes for 61% of total tax revenue on average, while for countries with income
above $8,000 the figure was 36.4%. Due (1988, p. 22).
2since it is in the poorer countries that black markets are most in evidence4. So
far, however, accounts of optimal taxation theory for the Third World have usually assumed
costless enforcement (see Newbery and Stern (1987), for an overview and many contributions).
This practice has also carried over into empirical exercises in optimal taxation (e.g., Ray (1989),
Newbery (1990)) and tax reform (Ahmad and Stern (1991)). This seems like a glaring lack,
precisely because the administrative difficulties that make indirect taxation so important in poorer
countries, making it difficult to get at incomes for taxation, are the very difficulties that make
enforcement costs so crucial. A shortage of skilled cadres is key in both5.
It would also be wrong to presume that an enforcement infrastructure, however costly, will
not affect optimal tax rates because it will simply constitute a fixed cost like any bureaucratic
overhead. This argument ignores the incentives created by taxes for evasion. This is because
it should stand to reason that an increase in a given tax rate also increases the profits to be made
from evading the tax, and thus increases the enforcement effort needed to keep the tax in effect.
There is thus a marginal enforcement cost to commodity taxation, which as will be seen later can
qualitatively change the structure of optimal taxes.
In this paper a simple model of legal and illegal trade is presented in which the legality
4Examples abound. For example, Mehta (1990, p. 181) estimates that 39% of the sales tax
in Rajasthan state, India, are evaded, and 73% of the state excise duties, along with 75-92% of
the excise on ghee and butter (pp. 121-2). Street vending in Mexico city, beyond the hand of
the sales tax, are studied in Cross (1995). Polyconomics, Inc. (1990) concluded that between
25% and 50% of the Mexican economy is in the "informal" sector (pp. 65-6), and that in Mexico
"tax avoidance [is] the raison d'etre of the informal economy" (p. 70).
5McLaren (1996) reviews some recent work on the evasion problem in LDC's. Incidentally,
these issues are certain to survive the waves of fiscal reform ongoing in many of these countries,
because indirect taxes will continue to be very important, and in many cases have become more
important with reform.
3of trade is endogenized and the effect of this on optimal taxation is analyzed. The intention is
to set up the simplest possible model of indirect tax evasion in order to get through the
complexities of characterizing the optimal tax system, in which both the set of taxes and the
enforcement system are chosen by the government. Some novel results emerging from this model
are: (i) For high enough taxes, there are always multiple equilibria, some with tax compliance
and some without6. This comes from a "market thinning effect" of tax compliance: Tax
compliance raises the price of the good in question, discouraging consumption and making the
market easier to police, (ii) In a black market for good i, a rise in the price of a substitute will
lower the price of good i, while the rise in the price of a complement will raise it. (iii) Even in
the presence of exogenously bounded fines for evasion and costly enforcement, it is always
possible, and optimal, to design the tax system so that no evasion occurs, (iv) The enforcement
cost of the tax system can be written as a function of the vector of commodity taxes, and it is
always non-convex. As a result, enforcement costs will in some cases be minimized by tax rates
that vary drastically from sector to sector. For this reason, in a simple parametric model, it turns
out that if the enforcement technology is poor enough, a 'cash-cow' system of taxation, in which
only one sector is taxed, becomes optimal ~ even if all sectors are ex ante symmetric. This can
give rise to a theory of changing tax structure over the course of economic development7.
6
 A related argument is made by Co well (1990, chapter 6), who discusses the possibility of
'evasion epidemics.' In that model, this arises from the assumption that a taxpayer's taste for
evasion is increasing in the amount of evasion conducted by others, possibly because of a
reduced stigma.
7See Gardner and Kimbrough (1992) for a different model of evolution of the tax system.
In that paper, exogenously specified collection costs lead to a movement away from tariffs,
through a combined tariff and excise system, to a pure income tax system as the government
grows. Income tax collection costs are assumed to have a kind of fixed cost nature, so when an
4The model of a black market presented here joins a long tradition. Following the seminal
Bhagwati and Hansen (1973) (BH), the great bulk of existing literature has taken policy as given
and asked the question, "Does smuggling raise or lower welfare," through either a model with
an exogenously specified smuggling cost function (for example, BH, Lovely (1994), Connolly,
Devereux, and Cortes, (1995)), or assumptions about the risk of detection (Kemp (1976), Pitt
(1981), Sheikh (1989), Virmani (1989)). The program of this paper is different. Here we take
the possibility of smuggling as given and ask how the government may optimally design the
system of taxes together with the enforcement system, taking that possibility into account.
A similar question has been posed in a number of earlier papers. Bhagwati and Srinivasan
(1974) study the effect of smuggling on optimal tariff setting, finding the effect ambiguous.
Kaplow (1990) studies optimal taxation and enforcement in a simple model of tax administration
with and without costly evasion. However, the fact that by assumption only one good is taxable
means that the question of the optimal tax structure, which is central to this paper, is absent.
Further, Kaplow assumes an interior optimum and studies the first order condition, whereas a
major point made here is that the enforcement problem can make the first order condition
irrelevant. Nevertheless, Kaplow's integration of the taxation and enforcement problems is an
important contribution. In a similar vein, Lovely (1995) studies the first order conditions for the
optimal tax vector in a model with costly evasion.
In related work, Kemp (1976) addresses the question of optimal tariffs in the face of
smuggling with a model of neoclassical trade in a small open economy. Importers may evade
income tax is introduced, it suddenly replaces all other taxes. In the present paper, collection
costs are endogenous, and the non-convexity in them is derived from the incentive constraints
underlying the problem.
5the tariff at the expense of fines, which are then distributed in a lump-sum manner to the general
public. There are no resource costs to illegal trade. Confining interest to the case in which legal
trade and smuggling coexist, he shows that any equilibrium without smuggling is equivalent to
one with smuggling, so that smuggling is irrelevant to the optimal tariff. The current paper is
very different in that we do not require black and legal markets to coexist, and we take account
of the real resource cost of enforcement. Finally, Lovely (1994) approaches the spirit of this
paper, by: (i) Considering the BH question under the assumption of pre-smuggling Ramsey-
optimal taxes; (ii) Considering the welfare effects of tightening enforcement.
One limit to the model we present is the assumption of perfect competition in trade,
regardless of its legality. This leads to some strong results, including naturally the absence of
rents to black market activity. In many markets this surely is realistic. To anyone who has had
the experience of standing in one spot in an African city and being approached by a unending
stream of young men, all offering illegal currency sales, the supply of traders can seem elastic
indeed. Illegal trade does not necessarily require significant capital investment; all that most
West African smugglers need, for example, is a bicycle, moped or canoe to join a large,
organized market for smuggled goods (Deardorff and Stolper, 1990, p. 133). However, there are
likely to be black markets into which entry is not free and rents are important. For example, the
lucrative illegal importation of cigarettes into Nigeria from Niger has been said to be the domain
of exactly fourteen traders (Azam, 1990). The mob violence that victimized some of the "market
women" in Accra at the time of the first Rawlings coup seems to have been motivated partly by
a public perception that those merchants had accumulated rents from their practice of dealing at
illegal prices (Hettne, 1980, pp. 184-5). These issues of market structure lie outside of the scope
6of this paper, but are surely important in some settings8.
A second key assumption made here is that the law of one price holds even in a black
market. A well-recognized price emerges which agents take as given, and any deviations could
be arbitraged away. Some observers argue that this is not the way real world black markets
work; Bevan, Collier and Gunning (1989), for example, argue that the inability to advertise
illegal prices makes price search costly, eliminating arbitrage and possibly market clearing. They
suggest that this view is consistent with Tanzanian survey data. Other case studies, however,
forcefully reaffirm the law of one price in illegal transactions: Morris and Newman (1989) in
Senegalese cereal markets, Azam (1990) in the market for Nairas, and Wade (1985) in various
bureaucratic bribes in India. Which view is a better approximation will likely depend on the
market and country in question but the assumption made here has the virtue of enormously
simplifying the analysis.
Section 2 studies the black markets of the model in partial equilibrium, taking policy as
given. Section 3 sets up the government's social choice problem given the nature of black
markets in general equilibrium, and provides two propositions which hugely simplify
optimization. The modified Ramsey rule is derived and its differences from the conventional one
discussed; the non-convexity of enforcement costs is demonstrated. A simple parametric example
is presented. Section 4 summarizes.
8Gordon (1990) provides a nice example of how the analysis can be affected by monopoly
power. He shows that if sellers of a taxed good are price setters, they may choose to offer two
prices for the same good, one for legal transactions and the other for illegal ones in which the
tax is retained. Consumers choose which to pay, thereby revealing something of themselves.
Thus the excise tax can give a monopolist an opportunity for imperfect price discrimination. This
is qualitatively different from anything in the present model.
2. Black Markets.
A. Partial Equilibrium: The Behaviour of Hawkers and the Street Price.
Consider a market for a good called i which is sold perfectly elastically by producers or
foreigners at the price p1 but on which the government has imposed a tax of I r Call q° = pff-Tj
the "official price" of the good. It is legal for anyone to trade the good and there is free entry
into trade, with no transport costs, and all private agents take prices as given. Now, any trader,
having bought the good at the world price, has the option of selling it, trying to hide the
transaction from the government9, and keeping the tax revenues, but if she is caught doing so her
profit on the transaction is confiscated and she must pay a fine of K{ as well10. There are L^  tax
inspectors in the market, checking for irregularities, and each can audit a, transactions.
Aggregate consumption of the good is denoted by x, = X,(q), where q is the price paid by
do not allow here for real resources consumed by attempts to conceal illegal
transactions. That is the heart of Bhagwati and Hansen (1973), but it is not clear that such costs
are always important in real world black markets. Indeed, Deardorff and Stolper (1990) argue
that in African economies illegal trade tends to consume fewer real resources than legal trade,
because it is free from the heavy regulation that burdens legal traders. However, it is
indisputable that real resources are consumed in the enforcement of taxes, and we do allow for
that.
10
 The penalty process as described by a street vendor in Mexico city: "... there was no
permission to sell, so since the (street inspector) trucks arrived, we had to find a way of working
early. We worked from 5 to 7:30 in the morning because the trucks arrived and removed us. At
first they just took the people, and the things were left thrown on the ground. But later, since the
government saw that some kept selling, they changed their system again. Then they came back
and they took all the merchandise. They let us go free, but they took your merchandise.
Everything, they took everything, whether it was money or the merchandise, everything there
was..." (Cross, 1996, p. 7.)
8consumers, and each unit consumed requires a separate transaction, so the probability of being
caught at evasion is e, = o^L^x,. Assume that X,(q) is continuous and decreasing, that X,(0) >
otjL^ , so that monitoring is imperfect, and that Xt(q)—>0 as q—><».
Equilibrium entails a price q at which the good is sold to consumers together with a
decision on whether or not to evade such that traders are maximizing expected profits and
potential traders are indifferent between entering and not entering. Profits from trading legally
are necessarily zero, so each trader will be willing to evade the tax if and only if (l-e^q-pj - e ^
> 0. Thus, if (l-ejx, = (l-e^q^-p,) < e-Kit then legality will be an equilibrium, while if %{ >
Kje/O-e,) all traders will evade in equilibrium. But then q° will not be the equilibrium price
because that would give traders positive expected profits and lead to entry. We call the
equilibrium price the "street price," and denote it q*. It must satisfy q* = pA + 1^/(1-e^, so that
evading traders will break even. In a black market equilibrium, that is, one in which all traders
evade the tax, the price paid by consumers must be q*, and this must be below the official price,
or a vendor could enter offering a price between the official and street prices, remit the tax
required, and make a risk-free profit.
In a black market equilibrium, then, all active traders "hawk" the good, or sell it below
the official price. Anyone trying to comply with the tax in such an equilibrium will be undersold
and driven out of business11. The hawkers themselves will at times appear to earn rents, as they
pocket the difference between the street price and the producer price, but on average the fines
they pay periodically will cancel those gains out. Their incomes from trade will thus be as they
nThus, legal and illegal trade cannot coexist unless q° = q*. This contrasts with Pitt (1981)
and Virmani (1989), who allow for the important possibility that a given trader can use legal
sales to camouflage illegal ones.
would have been under legal trade, that is, zero12.
Now we reach the first substantive point. The calculation of the street price is not
straightforward, owing to the endogeneity of the enforcement rate e,. This comes from the
dependence of el on x,. Demand for good i partly determines its price here because for a given
enforcement system the
probability of getting caught in Ifq" is in ...
an illegal transaction is greater
the smaller the number of total
transactions in the market, so in
a real sense the cost of hawking
a less popular good is higher
than that of hawking one more
popular. We will call this the
"market thinning effect". The
key thing to note here is that
one of the relevant consumer
... this range, only
legal trade is an
equilibrium.
... this range, only a black
market with street price q' is
an equilibrium.
... this range, black market street
prices q' and q", as well as legal
trade, are all equilibria.
\ Street price, <f
Figure 1: The determination of the street price.
prices for determining xt is q*, which is being determined. Thus, q* depends on e15 which depends
12In the real world, of course, trade consumes real resources, including the trader's time and
effort, which would receive an equilibrium return and add to the street price. Adding this to the
model would be immaterial to the points being made here — indeed, if the resource cost of a unit
of trade is u hours of labor and w is the going wage, then that would simply add wu to every
equilibrium price. We might as well let p1 include such costs rather than worry about them.
What is a significant assumption here is that trade is competitive whether it takes place legally
or not, so that high taxes do not generate monopoly profits for a handful of traders who can
evade successfully.
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in turn on q].
Define the function <fc(q5) = q* - a^K/tX^qO-a^H = q* - Kfi^l-e). Any q < q? which
satisfies ^(q) = pt is the street price for a black market equilibrium. This is illustrated in Figure
1. Further, if ^(q°) < p, then legality is an equilibrium, because then we will have (l-e^q^-p,)
< ejK, so that at the official price evasion is unprofitable. Finally, since x,—>0 as q|—**>, there is
a point at which (j), approaches minus infinity. These together show, with the help of Figure 1,
that <t>i has a maximum, which we denote p.
If the producer price pt is less than p, then there are at least two solutions13 to <|>i(q-)=Pi>
say q' and q". If the official price is below q', then only legal trade is an equilibrium. If the
official price is above q', then q' is a black market equilibrium. If it is above q' and q", then
they are both black market equilibria. But in this case there must be at least one more
equilibrium: if q°>q">q' and (^(q^p,, then legal trade is once again an equilibrium, and if
<|>i(q?)^ Pi, then there must be a third solution q'" to (j)(qw)=p1, with q'"<q°, so that there are three
black market equilibria. These observations can be summarized thus:
Proposition 1. If good i is characterized by imperfect monitoring and if there is any street price
that would allow hawkers to break even (i.e., §>0 anywhere), then there is a threshold value p
for the producer price such that:
(i) If Pi > p, there can be no black market for good i.
(ii) If pt < p, there will be zero, one, or at least two black market equilibria depending on
13For simplicity, the Figure is drawn as if there are only two, but of course in principle there
could be more.
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whether the official price is low, moderate, or high. When there are at least two, there is always
another equilibrium, which may be a legal one; indeed, for a high enough official price there will
always be at least two different black market equilibria and one legal one.
This is quite a surprising result, since this market would trivially have only one
equilibrium without the tax, while with a high tax it necessarily has at least three. This
multiplicity arises from the market thinning effect: at q", if all hawkers simultaneously offered
a lower price, demand would be stronger, the market thicker, and hence transactions less risky.
Thus they could all break even at the lower price; but one trader lowering the price alone would
make losses.
Further, we can easily imagine two identical countries with identical tax systems, one
riddled with black markets and the other law abiding. Stranger still, if transport costs within the
same country were high we could observe one city in which taxes are paid and another, a kind
of fiscal Gomorrah, in which each citizen evaded simply because everyone else in town did the
same. Both would be equilibria. Many observers of tax systems insist that 'psychological' and
'social' pressures play a great role in aggregate tax compliance, independently of parameters of
the tax system14; Proposition 1 may be thought of as a formalization of that suspicion through
an economic mechanism. Similarly, some seasoned observers of Third World tax systems have
14For example, Mehta (1990, p.22) maintains that "Psychological factors" leading to evasion
include "... the social environment, in which the tax payer lives. It may change the behaviour
and attitude of tax payers... thus, when a tax payer comes to know that many people in his
society are not paying taxes, then his determination in favor of tax compliance becomes feeble."
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long had a hunch that compliance en masse has a kind of self-reinforcing character15. Finally,
we can at times find a belief in this sort of multiple equilibria in the testimony of hawkers
themselves. In recent years Mexico City has accrued a large population of street vendors, who
sell a large variety of goods, particularly in the 'Historic District,' without paying any sales tax.
The government's relationship with them has been varied and ambivalent, but from 1993 to 1994
the Mexican government attempted to put an end to street vending in the Historic District by
building formal markets and requiring the street vendors to set up in them (Cross, 1995). Once
set up in a stall in the market, a vendor would be easily regulated by government inspectors (with
the help of government-sanctioned street vendor associations) and required to pay all sales taxes.
An analysis offered by one vendor then working within the government market system is
instructive.
A leader of a small association noted that, while he was loyal to
the PRI, "People are thinking ... if after the elections they don't
offer us a solution for the markets they are going to go back to the
streets—whatever opportunity they see they'll take." But they had to
wait for a large association to take the first step: "If I had the
number of people (the large associations) have I would do it. If I did
it now they would squash me with one hand. But I don't know—sometimes
its worth it to take a risk," he added. Furthermore, as this leader
pointed out, the competitiveness among leaders meant that as soon as
one association started to reinvade the streets, the others would be
compelled to follow to prevent other groups of vendors from taking
over the streets that over the years they have considered as "theirs". (Cross, 1995,
p. 14.)
The situation is complicated by the presence of the vendors' associations, the politics of the
15
"No matter how ideal the tax structure may be in terms of its objectives, the latter will not
be attained unless the tax is collected with a high degree of efficiency. Evasion by some firms
breeds evasion by others, who might have to evade to remain competitive. Evasion leads to
general disregard for the law. Loss of revenue may result in increasing tax rates, further
increasing the incentive to evade." Due (1988, p. 194.)
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situation, and other factors. However, the basic point is the same as the point of Proposition 1.
The vendor would like to return to illegality but it would be excessively dangerous if he did so
alone. If the bulk of vendors did so, on the other hand, not only would it be safe enough to be
possible for him to do so; competitive pressure would demand it. Thus, there are (at least) two
equilibria.
Having noted the odd effects of a very high tax, we will from here on in restrict attention
to small taxes, in other words, assume that there is only one solution q* to <t>i(q|)=pi with q-<q°.
Thus necessarily (})1'(q-)>0 (see Figure 1). With a unique equilibrium, we can speak of the street
price as a function of all exogenous variables. Some properties of this function emerge from
applying the Implicit Function Theorem to ({^(q^-p^O, which can also be read as shifting the ^
function in Figure 1. It is easy to verify that dfy/dLI < 0, so that dq-/9l^ > 0. Thus, as one might
guess, more vigourous policing of hawkers makes the good more expensive. Similarly, dq^K,
> 0. More surprisingly, if qj is the price of some other good denoted by j , since 3<|>i/3qj =
a1L^K/[xi-aiLj]2 dX/9qJ5 we have dq]/^ < 0 if i and j are gross substitutes and > 0 if they are
gross complements. This is exactly the reverse of the result one gets in partial equilibrium
analysis of a legal market. The reason is that raising the price of a gross substitute to i brings
consumers into the market for i, thickening the market and thus making sales of i safer.
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3. General Equilibrium, and the Social Choice Problem.
A. Objectives, Constraints, and Two Simplifications.
We have looked in some detail at the individual black markets in the model. Now they
can be assembled into general equilibrium, and the optimal tax system considered. Suppose that
the economy consists of a continuum of identical households of unit measure, each with an
indirect utility function u, whose arguments are the consumer prices q of the n private goods
available, the quantity xg of a pure public good, and income I. Assume that u is differentiable
and the derivative with respect to the last two arguments is strictly positive everywhere; that it
is additively separable in xg; and that the commodity demands, x(), have uniformly bounded
derivatives. Each household is endowed with a unit of labor, which it sells inelastically, and
which has a constant marginal value product of w. There are no other factors of production. The
government wishes to maximize the utility of the representative citizen16, n(q, xg, w).
The economy is small and open. For focus and brevity, we assume that there are no taxes
possible on imports, exports or production, merely on consumption. Extensions to those other
policies are obvious. We thus have (following the tradition of the optimal tax literature) a set
of exogenous producer prices plv.,pn. We further assume that lump-sum taxes are unavailable.
The government can produce the public good with labor by the technology xg = f(Lg), where Lg
is the amount of labor hired by the government for this purpose, and f'(L)>0 and f"(L)<0 VL.
16It would be straightforward to introduce distributional considerations into this model by
allowing for different types of household.
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It should also be pointed out that the important variables K, are taken as exogenous here,
because if they were allowed to be chosen in an unconstrained manner the government could
almost costlessly enforce all taxes by setting astronomical penalties which would never be paid
in equilibrium because no-one would ever evade in equilibrium. This is of course unrealistic,
partly because if this really was possible it is hard to see why we would see real-world black
markets, but partly because a threat to extract a fortune from a given guilty hawker may be quite
incredible. A threat to fine a violator down to the level of subsistence may be credible if the
government knows how big a fine that will have to be for a given hawker, but then that will run
into exactly the same revelatory problems as make true lump-sum transfers impossible to begin
with. If those problems did not exist there would be no point in messing with commodity taxes
at all. Even without those difficulties, it is likely that enormous suffering inflicted for a small
offense will be impossible under a real world criminal code because that would be offensive to
some concepts of justice, especially given that there is always a possibility of an erroneous
verdict. As difficult as it is to model the constraints on the choice of penalty, it is clear that in
the real world there are severe constraints on them, so, as with the absence of lump-sum taxes,
we will as a first pass simply leave them out of the set of choice variables. (For a discussion of
practical difficulties enforcing penalties for tax evasion in the Third World, see Radian (1980)).
Without loss of generality, let the first m goods be traded legally and the remainder
hawked. The functions ({), can be defined just as above, but now <]), is shifted by all prices other
than qt as well as by L^  and Kt (we will suppress these additional arguments for brevity). The
government's budget constraint is then:
16
ZT-itarPiMq, xg) + X^m+1[K1+(q:-Pl)] atf
> w5?=1L; + wLg,
where the vector q contains the first m official prices, which are actually the consumer prices for
those goods, followed by n-m street prices. The Kuhn-Tucker multiplier for this constraint is
denoted Xg. The first sum represents the taxes paid, and the second fine revenue and confiscated
earnings from discovered hawkers. It should be stressed that the number m is a choice variable
here: by its choice of taxes and enforcement structure, the government can choose which markets
will respect the tax and which will not. What is required is that for each sector i, (^(q^p, if i
is intended for legal trade, and (^(q-) = p, if i is a black market. We can call these n conditions
the 'incentive compatibility' constraints.
In short, the government chooses Lg, the set S of black markets, the vectors Le = [L ,^...,L ]^
and q° = [q?,...,q£], and street prices q\ for i = m+l,...,n subject to one budget constraint and n
incentive compatibility constraints, to maximize welfare17.
The optimization problem can be simplified by two propositions. The first is akin to a
"Laffer curve" proposition in Virmani (1989).
Proposition 2. Suppose thatF = ( Lg, S, Le, q°, {qi}1€S ) is a feasible plan of taxes, enforcement
and public good provision that induces black markets. Then there exists another plan, say F'
17The choice of n official prices q° is of course equivalent to the choice of the n tax rates z{.
The street prices must technically be included as choice variables to deal with the nuisance of
multiple equilibria; however, we will soon be able to dispense with this since it turns out that
multiple equilibria will not be an issue at the optimum.
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that does not induce black markets and that yields just as high a level of social welfare as F
does.
Proof: Set (Lg)' = Lg; S' equal to the null set; and (Le)' = Le. Then set (q°)' = q° for i= l,...,m
and (q°)' = q* for i= m+1,..., n. This defines a plan F' which satisfies the incentive compatibility
constraints trivially. F ; also gives the same consumer prices as F, hence provides the same value
for social welfare, and is feasible provided that it does not deliver any less revenue than F.
Revenue under plan F' is given by:
where z1 = (q -^Pi)- Revenue under plan F is equal to:
+
Thus, revenue under the two plans is equal. Q.E.D.
Thus, it is never strictly better to induce black markets18, even with the vector of
punishments exogenously constrained. The rather striking result that black markets could always
be swept away by an optimal tax system would not hold under some of the assumptions made
18Although it is worth remembering that it is a matter of indifference whether they are
permitted or not. Proposition 2 allows us to focus on the case without black markets for
simplicity without losing generality.
18
in the smuggling literature. Thus, for example, Pitt (1981) shows an example in which legal
sales, and hence tariff revenues, are greater in the presence of smuggling than in its absence,
because legal sales can be used to camouflage illegal ones, and thus the two kinds of trade are
in a sense joint outputs. In this case, Proposition 2 would clearly not hold. Other examples are
models with a rising marginal cost to smuggling, such as Lovely (1994)19. Thus, Proposition 2
is not presented as a robust policy prescription, but rather a result which hugely simplifies the
optimal tax problem in this model. Nonetheless, the mechanism of this proposition does have
important counterparts in the practice of tax reform. The practice of lowering the tax rate in
order to eliminate the smuggling is essentially the course followed by the Canadian government
in February 1994 in the case of the cigarette excise; the move virtually put an end to cigarette
smuggling and led to some calls for application of the policy to liquor and for imitation of it in
the U.S.20 This was also the move taken by Paraguay in January 1990 in the case of imports for
transhipment via the 'tourist trade.' In order to eliminate the rampant smuggling of such imports,
their tariffs were unified at the rate of 7%, much lower than the previous levels. The result was
an increase in tariff revenue as smuggling waned (Connolly et. al. (1995)).
From now on we will set m=n since that is optimal. The second simplifying proposition
concerns optimal hiring. Since the public good is assumed to have a positive marginal utility
everywhere and to be additively separable in utility, it is immediate that it is never optimal to
19However, in a model in which there was a constant marginal resource cost to evasion,
Proposition 2 would hold a fortiori.
20New York Times, February 9, 1994, p. A3; Chicago Tribune, February 9, 1994, p.2; Detroit
News, February 16, 1994, p. 6W; Chicago Tribune, March 30, 1994, p.l; Francis (1994); Carson
(1995).
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hire redundant tax inspectors. Any inspectors hired for sector i once the incentive compatibility
constraint for i is satisfied could be better deployed at producing the public good. Thus, we
have:
Proposition 3. In the optimal plan the government hires tax inspectors for each market up to
the point at which the incentives for tax evasion just disappear, or the street price rises until it
just equals the official price. Thus, L\ is chosen such that e,^ = (1-e,)!,, or equivalently,
L; =
Thus, enforcement costs are given by \j/ times the size of the market, where \|/ is a measure of
the incentive to evade and is rising in x{. The usual optimal tax problem has, in effect, at = °°
and thus \|/ = 0.
B. The Nature of the Optimum.
Using the simplifying results above, we can now eliminate the Lf as choice variables, by
substituting (1) in to the original optimization problem. The full first order condition for the
choice of tax rate is then easy to derive:
° + Xjx, + X^T^x/aq? - wZ^dLJ
(2) = y 1 - X 1^XJmJ)x1 - Ul Xl + V ^ T ^ - wV^dLJ/dT* - 0,
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by Roy's identity and Slutsky's Equation, where Uj is the marginal utility of income to the
representative household, nij is the marginal propensity to consume good j out of income, and s, j
is the cross-price derivative of compensated demand.
Most of this is familiar from the conventional optimal tax problem, and is a slight
generalization of Ramsey-type conditions; see Stern (1987). The first term is a marginal revenue
effect, the second gives the direct utility cost of a rise in the tax, and the third term is an
efficiency term measuring deadweight loss. The only change the enforcement problem makes
here is the addition of one more marginal cost term, namely, the last term, which records the
marginal enforcement cost of raising the ith tax.
However, this addition has the potential to change the nature of the problem in a drastic
way, because this marginal cost cannot be a globally rising cost, and indeed in many cases will





The first term in the own-tax derivative (i=j) is the direct effect: raising the tax on good
i raises the incentive to evade the tax on i (that is, ii/,), thus raising the cost of enforcement. The
second term is the market thinning effect: raising the tax on good i reduces the number of
transactions that occur in the 1th market, thus making hawking riskier and reducing the number
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of police needed to deter it. The cross-tax derivative is clearly a market-thinning or thickening
effect, depending on substitutability or complementarity. What is key to observe here is, first, that
the direct effect in (3) is globally decreasing in xx. Further, the total effect must decline to zero
as ij —> °o21. Thus, the marginal enforcement cost of a tax cannot possibly be rising everywhere,
and indeed the more usual case would be (when the direct effect dominates) that it will be falling
everywhere. This is a key qualitative difference between this and the more traditional features
of the optimal tax problem: enforcement costs tend to work against the second order condition22.
It is worth clarifying the source of this non-convexity in enforcement costs: It comes from
the principle that a high-tax sector must also be a high-risk sector from the point of view of
hawkers. Suppose that the demand for good i is perfectly inelastic and cross-price elasticities are
zero among goods with a positive tax so that only the direct effect is an issue. Consider
increasing the tax on good i from some initial level x* to x*+A and then to x*+2A, with A>0, each
time adjusting L* so that evasion is just deterred. For both increases in the tax, the level of
enforcement must be raised, but the first rise in L^  will be larger than the second one. The
reason is that when the tax is at x*+A, the probability that a hawker is caught is higher than it
is when the tax is at x* (otherwise the hawker would not be indifferent at both tax rates). Thus,
21This comes from (1), since x, must go to zero as X,—><=«, and from the assumption on
boundedness of demand derivatives.
22Although it is well known that the conventional optimal taxation problem can be non-
concave (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1974, (part II) discusses this), there is certainly no reason to
presume that it must be so; and indeed, in most parametric examples in practice, there is a
tendency for the marginal benefit term to fall in x; (since the x, will generally fall as taxes rise)
and for the marginal deadweight loss to rise (since it is roughly proportional to the tax rates).
The new term, marginal enforcement cost, is the first exception to this rule of thumb. This is
a marginal cost term that must fall for sufficiently high taxes. As a result, it can, in principle,
change the nature of the problem entirely.
22
although the rise in the tax rate, and thus the rise in the return to successful evasion, is the same
both times, the incentive to evade rises by less the second time. Thus, a smaller increase in
enforcement is needed to deter it the second time.
Thus, if the direct effect dominates, so that enforcement costs are globally concave in tax
rates, there is an enforcement-cost-minimization motive to look for tax rates that vary as much
as possible across sectors. It is
for this reason that if
enforcement costs are
important enough there is now
a presumption that the first
order condition will identify a
local minimum, and the true
optimum will be a corner
solution of some sort.
It is instructive to see
how this works in a simple
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Figure 2: The Nature of
Optimal Taxes.
parametric example. Suppose that there are two private goods, with p; = p, ax = a, and Kt = K
for i=l,2. The amount of public employment required is fixed at R, and the utility function is
CES with elasticity O, so that indirect utility is given by:
v(x1? x2, w, o) = w [(p+r,)1-0 + (P+X 2 ) 1 0 ]1 0 ] 1 / ( O 1 ) if
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where we write the function in terms of tax rates for convenience.
In the absence of an enforcement problem, uniform commodity taxes would trivially be
optimal in this case, and indeed, they would meet the revenue requirement with no deadweight
loss. With the enforcement problem, it is immediate that uniform taxes can always solve the first
order condition here because of the symmetry of the goods, and indeed, it can easily be shown
that for any a there is a unique uniform tax rate that satisfies the budget constraint. The question
is: Is this interior solution the optimum?
The full optimum can be computed as follows23. For any a and G, given any tax pair
(ll5 X2), it is straightforward from Proposition 3 to see what the implied enforcement labor force
is, and from that and the demand system to see whether or not the government meets its revenue
needs. Thus, for any value of x2, we can verify numerically whether or not there exists a zl such
that the budget requirement is met; if so, we can find the smallest such ij and use that tax pair
to calculate utility. A grid search along this interval of feasible values for x2 then can be used
to find the optimum.
The results of this procedure, for w = p = l , R = K = V£, and a range of values for a and
G, are summarized in Figure 2. The downward-sloping curve represents (a, a) pairs for which
the utility from a tax pair (x,, 0) that satisfies the budget constraint is equal to the utility from
the uniform tax rate that satisfies the budget constraint. For points above the curve, the optimum
is uniform taxation. For points below the curve, the optimum comes from setting one of the
taxes equal to zero, thus the farthest possible departure from uniformity. The trade-off is clear:
If a is large, the enforcement problem is not serious, and is dominated by the familiar logic of
23Full details are available from the author on request.
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deadweight loss; the optimum solves a Ramsey-type first order condition. If a is small, the
enforcement problem is overriding, and due to the concavity of enforcement costs in the tax
vector, the maximum tax spread is desired. There is nothing in between. Further, holding a
constant, increasing o raises the deadweight loss from any departure from uniformity, and makes
it difficult to raise the required revenue from non-uniform rates because of the inclination of
consumers to flee the taxed good. Thus, it is for high values of a and a that uniform taxation
is desirable, and for low values that maximally non-uniform taxes are desirable.
Thus, we see a result much unlike standard optimal tax propositions. If the administrative
capability of the tax office is low or if goods from the various sectors are very poor substitutes,
a 'cash cow' tax system is optimal, in which one sector is designated to be the source of all
revenue24, even in a case in which all sectors are ex ante identical25. It is only for a sufficiently
competent administration or high substitutability that the balancing of deadweight losses at the
margin even matters. This can be used to interpret a variety of stylized facts in the history of
tax systems in the Third World.
First, we may associate the 'cash cow' outcome with a narrow set of excise taxes (or
possibly trade taxes) and the 'Ramsey' outcome with a broad set of indirect taxes such as a sales
tax. One of the best known facts about the evolution of tax systems is a strong tendency of
24In a richer model with several sectors varying in demand and administration parameters, it
would not necessarily be only one sector, of course. The point is that there would be a motive,
if o '^s generally were low, to create a highly non-uniform system with several sectors left out of
the tax system entirely.
25Please note that this occurs despite that fact that there was no assumption of a fixed cost
to administering a tax. The result comes entirely from the concavity of enforcement costs, which
is a consequence of the incentive compatibility constraint (1). It would clearly hold a fortiori
if there were fixed costs as well ~ a reasonable assumption in many settings.
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excise systems with narrow effective bases to emerge first, and then after a long period of
development for the sales taxes to be introduced26. As of 1935, only one developing country, the
Philippines, had a real sales tax27; they all had excises, which have shown a strong tendency to
be effectively concentrated on a very small number of goods28 (although many more may be
listed as under excise officially). In many countries the government relied on a single export tax
(perhaps concealed in the 'marketing margin' of a statutory marketing board) for a large fraction
of its revenue29. However, over time countries establish broad based sales taxes and VAT's.30
At times, this can lead to dramatic, rapid broadenings of the tax system. For example, Zambia
had no sales tax at all until 1973, relying mainly on excises on copper and beer. As of 1983, its
sales tax accounted for 24% of total revenue, a tremendous jump from zero. In Tanzania, the
sales tax went from 16% of total revenue in 1974 to 54% in 1981. (Due, 1988, p. 102.)
The point is that something much like this very broad pattern would be predicted by this
model. Imagine a country with initially a very low level of literacy and information
infrastructure, a small stock of trained accountants and essentially no computers, in other words,
26See, for example, Due (1988, Ch. 5-7).
27Due (1988, pp. 82-3).
28As is true of excises even now. Due (1988) lists 14 countries for whom excises on gasoline
and diesel fuel make of at least 59% of excise revenue (p. 73); 9 countries for which excises on
alcoholic beverages make up at least 41% of excise revenue (p. 64), and 5 for whom excises on
tobacco make up at least 44% of excise revenue (p. 64).
29This is extensively documented for several African states by Bates (1981). See especially
pages 12-9.
30Although as Tanzi (1987, p. 227) points out, they are rarely really comprehensive, or as
comprehensive in practice as they appear on paper. Nonetheless, they tend to be substantially
more broad-based than the excise system.
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a country with a very low a. In this model, if that country followed the optimal tax policy it
would use a very narrowly based excise tax and nothing else. On the other hand, if we assume
that the level of education and infrastructure, and thus administrative effectiveness and hence a
would rise over time, eventually the economy
would cross the curve in Figure 2 and would
jump to an all-inclusive sales-tax system. It
is worth pointing out that one of the correlates
of large-scale tax reforms in developing
countries is indeed a large improvement in the
overall administrative effectiveness in the tax
administration (Thirsk, 1993, pp. 189-90).
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Figure 3: The effect of a rise
in the revenue requirement.
and still one of the very few developing
countries with a broad, effective sales tax at
the retail level, is explained by the fact that in that country retailing is primarily carried out in
urban areas, and by formal commercial establishments with literate clerks and a strong tradition
of good record keeping (Due, 1988, pp. 120-1). In other words, in terms of this model it is
because this is a high a economy.
The proposition that a more ineffective tax administration should lead to large portions
of the economy being untaxed runs counter to the spirit of Ramsey-type analysis, and indeed, it
is sometimes argued that in the presence of poor administration, tax uniformity may be the only
practical policy (e.g., Tait(1989), Thirsk (1993, pp. 181-3). In this model, we find the opposite
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result, and it roughly fits international experience.
The second empirical observation on tax reforms in practice is that they tend to be
associated with a fiscal crisis in the government. This is observed, for example, by Thirsk (1993,
p. 178) in his survey of recent tax reforms. The Zambian reforms coincided with the slide in
copper prices in the latter 1970's, with its devastating effect on the Zambian treasury; the
Mexican reforms over 1978-8231 coincided with the onset of government insolvency. This also
fits the current model quite well. Suppose that for reasons of increased foreign debt obligations
or any other reason the amount of revenue required by the government, R, goes up. The effect
on the cash-cow-Ramsey locus is shown in Figure 3. A rise in revenue requirements shifts the
locus down, expanding the space in which broad-based taxation is optimal. The reason is clear:
With a rise in R, the tax rate on the 'cash-cow' sector required to meet budget balance goes up;
thus, the intersectoral distortion of this form of taxation goes up, lowering its appeal relative to
the broad-based taxation. Thus, if we observe an economy at B, with R initially at %, and a
disaster such as rising international interest rates pushes R up to %, if the government behaves
optimally, we will see a sudden tax reform. All of the economists' long pleas for broad-based
taxation of consumption will finally be answered. However, it is not because the government has
suddenly acquired wisdom; it is simply an optimal response to a changed situation. Further, the
country will indeed be worse off. If misunderstanding voters perceive the reform to be the reason
for their misery rather than its mitigator, politics may cause a good policy to be undone.
31Substantial broadening of the indirect tax base, including introduction of a VAT, was a key
feature of these reforms (Gil Diaz, 1987). It should be noted, however, that the country slid back




A simple model of indirect taxation, evasion, and enforcement has been presented in
which some surprising results emerge. In the partial equilibrium version, we find that high taxes
lead to multiple equilibria (low-price black markets and high-price legal markets), and
comparative statics always give the 'wrong' sign. Both are due to the 'market-thinning' effect.
In general equilibrium, we find that the optimal system is qualitatively different for relatively
effective administrations compared to relatively ineffective ones. The former follow slightly
modified Ramsey optima, trading off marginal deadweight loss across sectors. The latter
optimally ignore such matters, pick a sector at random (in a symmetric model), and use it to raise
all of the revenue. This is because the incentive compatibility constraint confers a kind of
concavity on enforcement costs. This finding provides some predictive value for the evolution
of tax systems.
Some small caveats may be in order. The precise mathematics are likely to differ
somewhat with different assumptions about the nature of tax evasion technology, and in
particular, as noted, Proposition 2 is not likely to hold with some of the assumptions popular in
the literature. It may well be, however, that something similar in the behaviour of the full
optimum would be likely to hold, because the arguments for why the direct effect of the tax rate
on enforcement costs must fall (following (3)) seem likely to be much more general than this
model. Second, there has been no attempt here to argue that actual tax systems ~ in Zimbabwe
or anywhere else — are necessarily (or probably) optimal. Nonetheless, it is possible that a broad
pattern in the response of the conceptual optimum to a change in the environment can give hints
29
as to why actual tax systems change in the way they do. Perhaps this general approach can lead
to a richer and more nuanced positive theory of tax systems than that suggested here.
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